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The Doctrine of Political Accountability
and Supreme Court Jurisdiction:
Applying a New External Constraint to
Congress's Exceptions Clause Power
Christopher T. Handman
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost our
power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would
be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of
the several States.'
But it is time we came to realize that in a democracy conflict over
basic policy cannot be avoided and that when too long delayed it may,
like Langston Hughes' dream deferred, explode.2
I. INTRODUCTION: PAST CONGRESSIONAL ACTS AND A NEW PROPOSAL TO
LIMIT CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY UNDER THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE
Throughout the twentieth century, fundamental changes in political power
often have ushered in novel and hostile attacks on the federal judiciary's
jurisdiction. From the Roosevelt court packing plan, through numerous
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291.295-96 (1920)
2. 1. Skelly Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice. 81 YALE LJ. 575. 586 (1972) (book review)
3. The history of Roosevelt's plan and its eventual failure are well documented in Michael Comiskey.
Can a President Pack-or Draft-the Supreme Court? FDR and the Court in the Great Depression and
World War 11, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1043 (1994). See generally I RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOioi E. NOWAK.
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.7 (2d ed. 1992) (chronicling history of court packing plan)
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proposals during the Reagan years to limit federal court jurisdiction,4 to the
recently enacted Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,' the
federal courts-and particularly the Supreme Court-often have occupied the
center of political power struggles.
With the 1994 "Republican revolution,"6 dormant proposals to limit
Supreme Court jurisdiction may have found new life.7 In response to
perceived abuses of the writ of habeas corpus, Congress enacted the
Antiterrorism Act to eliminate second or successive appeals of habeas
applications to the Supreme Court.8 Though rarely invoked during the history
of the American republic, Congress exercised its Exceptions Clause power
under Article II19 to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to hear appeals
from lower court denials of second habeas petitions: "[T]he grant or denial of
an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application
shall not be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for rehearing
or for a writ of certiorari."' In Felker v. Turpin, the Supreme Court resolved
the legitimacy of the Act without addressing the constitutionality of the
jurisdiction stripping provision." Nonetheless, the Act presents grave
questions about one of Congress's potentially greatest powers.
4. During the early 1980s, there were numerous proposals that would have removed controversial
issues from the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Many of these bills attempted to deny the lower federal
courts jurisdiction to issue restraining orders, injunctions, and declaratory judgments over state abortion
laws. See, e.g., H.R. 3225, 97th Cong. § 4 (1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong. § 2 (1981); S. 158, 97th Cong.
§ 2 (1981). Congress also attempted to withdraw the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over abortion issues. See,
e.g., H.R. 867, 97th Cong. § 1 (1981).
School prayer proved equally prone to congressional attempts at jurisdiction stripping. Several bills
sought to deny to all federal courts-including the Supreme Court-the jurisdiction to hear cases contesting
state laws that authorized public school prayer. See, e.g., H.R. 2347, 97th Cong. §§ 2-3 (1981); S. 481,
97th Cong. §§ 2-3 (1981); H.R. 865, 97th Cong. §§ 2-3 (1981); H.R. 72, 97th Cong. §§ 1-2 (1981).
5. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
6. See, e.g., R.W. Apple, Jr., Voters May Feel Powerless, But They're Not Frightened, N.Y. TIMES,
May 28, 1995, at I (characterizing 1994 general election in which Republicans gained majority in both
House and Senate as "Republican revolution"); David S. Broder, Looking for Leadership, WASH. POST,
Nov. 6, 1995, at AI (same).
7. Judge Hufstedler has commented that "congressional reaction to issues of federal jurisdiction has
always been fitful and ... the fits are usually induced by strong pressures imposed by particular events
or by powerful constituencies that seek to influence results in particular causes that concern them." Shirley
M. Hufstedler, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the Federal Judiciary, 47 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 841, 842-43 (1972).
8. See § 106(b)(I)-(2), I10 Stat. at 1220-21.
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 provides in pertinent part:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a
State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases
before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact,
with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
10. § 106(b)(3)(E), I10 Stat. at 1221.
II. See Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2338-39 (1996). As discussed in Section ll.B, infra, the
Court found that the Act did not reach the Court's original jurisdiction to grant habeas petitions pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994). See Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2339. By finding that the Act did not entirely repeal
the Court's "authority to entertain a petition for habeas corpus, there can be no plausible argument that the
Act has deprived this Court of appellate jurisdiction in violation of Article Ill, § 2." Id.
Jurisdiction Stripping
Habeas corpus, however, represents but one controversial issue that has
divided the Court and Congress. While the Court's decision in Casey v.
Planned Parenthood2 may have temporarily resolved a constitutional legal
question, the decision did nothing to quell the fervor with which many
Americans approach the issue of abortion.3 Moreover, Congress remains
preoccupied with the Court's 1989 decision invalidating a Texas flag burning
statute.' 4 Its recent failure to pass a constitutional amendment 5 that would
have reversed the Court's ruling may impel some members of Congress to
seek alternative means of escaping the Court's rulings. Set within this new
political climate, the saliency of abortion, death penalty appeals, and other
controversial constitutional issues may renew congressional efforts to restrict
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over these classes of cases.' 6
In the end, the Felker decision may be a lot of sound and fury signifying
nothing about the Exceptions Clause. Of far greater significance, however, is
the simple fact that Congress mustered the political will to strip the Supreme
Court of its appellate jurisdiction. Whether the Antiterrorism Act is an anomaly
or a precursor to increasing attempts at jurisdiction stripping remains to be
seen. This Note attempts to provide a principled theory that may be applied if
Congress once again tests its Article III power.
In unqualified language, Article III of the Constitution provides that the
"supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with
such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall 71ake.'"
Scholars who have addressed this issue before have divided into two extremes:
those who find Congress may act with plenary authority and those who would
limit Congress's power so as not to intrude upon the Supreme Court's
"essential functions."' Problems exist with both theories. The exceptional
congressional power that the absolutists envision would undermine important
constitutional structure. On the other hand, essential functions proponents are
12. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming constitutional right to abortion)
13. See Alissa J. Rubin, As Congress Takes up Social Issues Whose Values H7ll Pre% ail. WASHe POST.
May 7, 1995, at C3 (citing 1992 Washington Post poll indicating 80% of Americans favor parental
notification and 1992 Gallup poll indicating 75% support 24-hour waiting peinod); Robin Toner. Success
Spoils Unity of Abortion Rights Groups, N.Y. T3MEs. Apr. 20. 1993. at A18 (noting majority support for
abortion, but overwhelming support for some regulation short of absolute ban).
14. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); see also United States Y Eichman. -196 U S 310
(1990).
15. See Kenneth J. Cooper, House Approves Amendment on Flag Desecration. Measure Would
Override High Court Rulings, Let States and Congress Outlaw the Act. WASH. POST. June 29. 1995. at A7
(documenting successful 312-120 House vote); Helen Dewar. Senate Falls Short on Flag Amendment.
Desecration Ban Was Measure's Aim, WASH. PosT. Dec. 13. 1995. at AI (noting Scnatc's 63-36 defeat
of amendment, three votes short of requisite two-thirds majority)
16. Senator Jesse Helms claims constitutional support for his proposals to withdraw junsdiction from
the Supreme Court: "In anticipation of judicial usurpations of power. the framers of our Constitution wisely
gave the Congress the authority, by a simple majonty of both Houses. to check the Supreme Court by
means of regulation of its appellate jurisdiction." 125 CONG. REC. 7579 (1979)
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (emphasis added).
18. See infra Part III (discussing various theories concerming jurisdiction strpping legislation)
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unable to reconcile their position with the literal language of Article IIl.'9 Yet
there does exist common ground. All commentators recognize that Congress
still must abide by "external" constitutional constraints. That is, generally
applicable limitations on congressional lawmaking-equal protection and bill
of attainder prohibitions, for example-do not vanish merely because Congress
invokes its Exceptions Clause power.
This Note suggests new constraints on Congress's power to restrict the
Court's appellate jurisdiction. The recent importance attached to the doctrine
of political accountability provides a different set of limits on congressional
power under Article III. In the administrative law context, when Congress
seeks to impose controversial policy, it often passes vague laws that delegate
to other entities the authority to prescribe substantive policy. Such policy
delegation facilitates Congress's ability to pass divisive legislation. Congress's
diminished accountability to the electorate has captured the concern of courts
and commentators alike-leading many to conclude that unaccountable
legislation is unconstitutional legislation.20
The doctrine of political accountability, as a generally applicable, external
constraint on congressional power, requires Congress to address affirmatively
underlying policy concerns when it seeks to revoke Court jurisdiction. Under
this theory, Congress retains plenary authority to restrict the Court's
jurisdiction over laws that Congress itself passes. If, for example, Congress
passed its own flag burning law, and then stripped the Court of jurisdiction to
hear challenges to the law, there would be no violation of political
accountability because Congress squarely addressed the underlying issue:
whether flag burning can be proscribed. But, political accountability militates
against Congress insulating state laws from Court review in the manner that
it traditionally has attempted to employ. Most, if not all, of Congress's recent
jurisdiction stripping proposals deny the Court jurisdiction to hear any state
law regulating abortion.2' This sidesteps the fundamental policy
determination: to what extent abortion should be regulated.
The political accountability doctrine, however, is not so rigid as to prevent
Congress from balancing whatever slight federalism interest there exists in
exempting state laws from Court review. If Congress affirmatively decides the
parameters within which the states may act, it will have accountably addressed
the substantive policy questions. Thus, if Congress were to pass a law that
"authorized" the states to regulate abortion so long as an exception were made
19. But see Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article 11". Separating the Two Tiers of
Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 242 (1985). Amar emphasizes that the word "all" is selectively
used in Article III to define those cases to which the judicial power "shall extend." Where the Constitution
extends jurisdiction to "all cases," Amar reads this as an immutable grant of jurisdiction- where the "all"
has been omitted, he is willing to concede that Congress may restrict federal court jurisdiction. For further
discussion of Amar's theory, as well as its critics, see infra note 51.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See supra note 4.
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for emergency health situations, and concomitantly exempted this statute from
the Court's appellate jurisdiction, this would comport with political
accountability. Here, Congress is acting notoriously; its "political decisions
satisfy the fundamental principle that those with the power to make decisions
should bear, to the fullest extent possible, the costs and benefits and the credit
and blame for their decisions. 22
The application of the doctrine of political accountability to the Exceptions
Clause has many advantages. First, it accepts Article III's literal language, and
does not require novel linguistic acrobatics. Second, a natural product of this
theory is that it will increase congressional deliberation. In turn, greater
deliberation will likely minimize the frequency with which Congress invokes
the Exceptions Clause, and suggests that when it does so, its proposals will
reflect greater moderation than if it legislated free from accountability
requirements. Although political accountability erects an important procedural
limitation on Congress's Exceptions Clause authority, the substantive power
remains as potent as ever; only now, Congress must muster a true national
consensus before it legislates. Moreover, the doctrine is sensitive to federalism.
Political accountability preserves Congress's ability to insulate state laws from
Court review provided that Congress affirmatively delineates how far the states
may legislate free from Court review. That political accountability requires
Congress to define the limits of state action is no infringement on federalism.
After all, Congress could impose no limits on state regulation, so long as it
explicitly communicates this to the electorate through an open debate and vote.
In this Note, Parts II and III examine the manner in which the Court and
scholars have grappled with jurisdiction stripping. Part IV explores the
evolution of political accountability, and applies the doctrine to the Exceptions
Clause debate-demonstrating how this constitutional doctrine provides a
salutary basis for defining congressional authority over the Court's exercise of
judicial review. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. FROM MCCARDLE TO FELKER: AN EXAMINATION OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S APPROACH TO THE EXCEPTIONS CLAUSE
Since the days of John Marshall, 23 the Supreme Court has been a
perennial target of political attacks. While Congress has made several attempts
to restrict Supreme Court jurisdiction,4  it has succeeded only once.25
22. D. Bruce LaPierre, Political Accountability in the National Political Process-The Alternative to
Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 577. 646 (1985).
23. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816). the Marshall Court affirmed the
Supreme Court's authority to review and invalidate unconstitutional state laws. In turn. this ruling prompted
radical states' rights advocates to attempt to repeal section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. ch. 20. § 25.
I Stat. 73, 85-87 (1861), which provided the basis for the Court's review of state laws
24. See supra note 4.
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Despite the limited opportunity for the Court to pass upon the constitutionality
of this practice,26 legal academics have more than made up for the lack of
Court precedent.
2 7
A. Ex parte McCardle: The Court Addresses Jurisdiction Stripping
The only opportunity for the Supreme Court to address directly the scope
of Congress's power under the Exceptions Clause came in 1868.28 Charged
with various offenses under the Reconstruction Acts, including "disturbing the
peace, inciting to insurrection and disorder, libel, and impeding
reconstruction,"29 McCardle unsuccessfully brought an action for habeas
corpus in federal court. McCardle appealed the denial of his habeas petition to
the Supreme Court under an 1867 congressional statute authorizing the Court
to hear habeas appeals.3° Three days after the Court heard arguments on the
merits of McCardle's appeal, 3t the Reconstruction Congress repealed the
jurisdiction granting portion of the 1867 law. After a year of delay,32 the
25. See Act of Mar. 27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44 (1869) (repealing Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28,
§ 1, 14 Stat. 385 (1868)).
26. See Exparre McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (upholding Congress's revocation of Court's
authority to hear habeas corpus case). The McCardle decision and its significance are discussed infra
Section II.A.
27. The vast body of commentary makes it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of sources. The
more notable contributions include: Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of
1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Amar, supra note 19; Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over
the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982); Leland E. Beck, Constitution,
Congress, and Court: On the Theory, Law, and Politics of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court, 9 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 773 (1982); Theodore Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to
Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974); Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power
to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV.
895 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Leonard G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on
Judicial Review: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982)
[hereinafter Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints]; Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960) [hereinafter Ratner, Congressional
Power]; Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal
Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U. L. REV. 143 (1982); Ralph A. Rossum, Congress,
the Constitution, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Letter and the Spirit of the
Exceptions Clause, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 385 (1983); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of tile
Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 543 (1985).
28. See McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506.
29. William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229, 236
(1973).
30. See Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (1868).
31. It should be noted that before the argument on the merits of McCardle's habeas petition, the Court
held a preliminary argument to address whether the new 1867 habeas law provided the Court with
jurisdiction to hear McCardle's appeal. See Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1867). The Court
established that the case was properly before it and asked the parties to brief and argue the merits.
32. Indicative of the political context in which the McCardle case was decided, the year-long delay
in reargument stemmed from Chief Justice Chase's duty to preside over the impeachment proceedings of
President Andrew Johnson. Moreover, Johnson had unsuccessfully vetoed Congress's repeal of the Court's
1867 habeas jurisdiction. For an excellent presentation of the political and legal background to the
Jurisdiction Stripping
parties reargued the case, focusing on the effect of Congress's withdrawal of
jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Chase's opinion broadly affirmed Congress's plenary power
to regulate the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Without resort to complex,
structural analyses or to the Framers' intent, the Court easily dispensed with
the case by mechanically applying the literal language of Article III. Echoing
the Exceptions Clause's prose, the Chief Justice noted that although the
Constitution conferred appellate jurisdiction on the Court, it did so "'with such
exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make.'"3 Congress's
specific repeal of the Court's 1867 habeas jurisdiction made "[it ... hardly
possible to imagine a plainer instance of positive exception."'
Despite the unqualified tone of the opinion, the unique political
environment surrounding the case35 suggests that McCardle may be read more
narrowly. The Court, no doubt, recognized that a contrary decision would
invite an inevitable dispute with Congress. Already under attack from
Congress, the Court had witnessed the legislature slash its membership from
ten to seven justices.36 Moreover, the House already had passed a bill that
would have required a supermajority of the Court to invalidate an act of
Congress.37
Of perhaps greatest significance, the 1867 law under which McCardle
originally brought his habeas appeal merely supplemented a preexisting avenue
of appeal. Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 already provided that the
Supreme Court and "all the before-mentioned courts of the United States, shall
have power to issue writs of ... habeas corpus."38 Cognizant of this
alternative, the Court was able to avoid a political confrontation with Congress
by affirming its Exceptions Clause power, yet preserve the right of future
petitioners to obtain writs of habeas corpus from the Court through an
alternative legislative authorization. Indeed, in McCardle, the Court, possibly
offering litigating hints to prospective petitioners, concluded its opinion with
the following observation:
Counsel seem to have supposed, if effect be given to the repealing act
in question, that the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of
habeas corpus, is denied. But this is an error. The act of 1868 does
not except from that jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit
Courts under the act of 1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction which
was previously exercised.39
McCardle case, see Van Alstyne, supra note 29.
33. McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 513 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 111. § 2)
34. Id. at 514.
35. See supra note 32 for factors contnbuting to this political context.
36. See Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, § 1. 14 Stat. 209 (1868)
37. See H.R. 379, 40th Cong. (1868).
38. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14. I Stat. 73, 81-82 (1861)
39. McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515.
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A year after the McCardle decision, the Court affirmed its jurisdiction over
habeas petitions brought pursuant to section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
in Ex parte Yerger:
Our conclusion is, that none of the acts prior to 1867, authorizing this
court to exercise appellate jurisdiction by means of the writ of habeas
corpus, were repealed by the act of that year ... and [the 1868 act]
must be limited in effect to the appellate jurisdiction authorized by the
act of 1867.40
Ultimately, the Justices probably wanted not only to avoid confrontation with
Congress, but also to avoid prolonging the divisions that still remained from
the Civil War.4'
B. Felker v. Turpin: McCardle Revisited 128 Years Later
Nine days after President Clinton signed the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 199642 into law, the Supreme Court granted certiorari
to determine whether the Act's revocation of the Court's jurisdiction over
successive habeas petitions was constitutional.43  Congress created a
"'gatekeeping' mechanism for the consideration of second or successive
applications in district court."44 Under this gatekeeping structure, a three-
judge panel of appeals court judges determines whether an applicant's second
habeas petition should be granted. Whether the three-judge panel denies or
grants the petition, its decision "shall not be appealable and shall not be the
subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ of certiorari. 45 Congress's
attempt to remove habeas petitions from the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction offered the Justices an opportunity to resolve definitively the scope
of Congress's Exceptions Clause power. The Court, however, balked at
reaching this sensitive issue. Instead, it adopted the rationale of Ex parte
Yerger.4 As in Yerger, the Felker Court refused to find that the jurisdiction
stripping legislation extended by implication to the Court's authority to grant
habeas petitions brought pursuant to the Court's original jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 2241. 47
40. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 106 (1868).
41. See Van Alstyne, supra note 29, at 248.
42. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
43. See Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996).
44. Id. at 2337.
45. § 106(b)(3)(E), I10 Stat. at 1221.
46. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 106 (1868).




The Felker Court explained that because the Act did not repeal the Court's
"authority to entertain a petition for habeas corpus, there can be no plausible
argument that the Act has deprived this Court of appellate jurisdiction in
violation of Article III, § 2."' Although the Court refused to decide Felker
based on the Exceptions Clause, three Justices wrote separately "to add that if
it should later turn out that statutory avenues other than certiorari for reviewing
a gatekeeping determination were closed, the question whether the statute
exceeded Congress's Exceptions Clause power would be open." 9
III. OF ABSOLUTES, ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS, AND EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS:
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SCHOLARLY OPINION
Despite its astounding volume, the scholarly debate over the Exceptions
Clause has been marked by a surprising lack of diversity of arguments. The
debate over jurisdiction stripping is largely between only two schools of
thought.50  Despite subtle differences within each theory, the arguments
conclude either that: (1) Article III contains implicit internal constraints on
Congress's Exceptions Clause power;5" or (2) the Exceptions Clause broadly
empowers Congress to restrict Supreme Court jurisdiction." In order to place
my theory in proper context, I will briefly summarize this ongoing dialogue
and indicate why neither view is satisfactory.
48. Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2339.
49. Id. at 2342 (Stevens, Souter, Breyer, JJ., concumng).
50. For an excellent collection of essays from scholars on both sides of the issue. see Symposium.
Congressional Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REv 893 (1982) (containing essays from
Paul M. Bator, Charles E. Rice, Martin H. Redish. Leonard G. Ratner. Dr. James McClellan. and Kenneth
R. Kay).
51. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 19; Amar, supra note 27. Robert N Clinton. A Mandator, View of
Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article II1, 132 U PA L
REV. 741 (1984); Eisenberg, supra note 27; Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints. supra note 27
To be sure, theories outside of the established schools of thought exist which turn on subtle linguistic
interpretations of Article III. First, several commentators argue that the Exceptions Clause only modifies
the word "Fact," instead of "appellate jurisdiction" as is generally accepted. See. e.g. RAOUL BERGER.
CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 285-96 (1969); Irving Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction- Congressional
Abuse of the Exceptions Clause, 53 OR. L. REv. 3 (1973). This theory's paucity of histoncal support.
coupled with its odd grammatical interpretation, has made it the target of substantial crticism See. e g.
Gunther, supra note 27, at 901; Martin H. Redish. Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court
Appellate Jurisdiction Under an Internal and External Examnanon. 27 VILL L REV 900. 913-15 (1982)
[hereinafter Redish, Congressional Power].
A second theory also requires a novel linguistical approach to Article Ill. Professor Amar argues that
the word "all" delineates the power Congress possesses to restmct federal court junsdiction See Amar.
supra note 19, at 238-54. Among the classes of cases and controversies enumerated in Article Ill. Amar
notes that only three classes of cases are preceded by "all." In those cases preceded b) "all." including
"cases arising under federal law," Amar would prohibit Congress from remo% ing federal court jurisdiction
Like Burger's theory, Amar's theory has not been immune from criticism See. e.g. William R Casto, An
Orthodox View of the Two-Tier Analysis of Congressional Control Over Federal Jurisdiction. 7 CO 'isT
COMMENTARY 89 (1990); Martin H. Redish, Text. Structure. and Common Sense in the Interpretation of
Article 111, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633 (1990) [hereinafter Redish. Common Sense]
52. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 27; Redish. supra note 27
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A. "Essential Functions" and Other Internal Constraint Theories
In what may be the single most famous sentence to address this issue,
Professor Henry Hart admitted that Congress possessed the authority to restrict
the Court's jurisdiction, but insisted that "the exceptions must not be such as
will destroy the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional
plan. 53 Despite Hart's failure to define the precise contours of his theory,
subsequent scholars have attempted to add meaning to this phrase. While
minor differences exist between Hart's disciples, they all conclude that the
theory proscribes wholesale elimination of the Court's jurisdiction over discrete
classes of cases.
Professor Leonard Ratner was the first to add substance to the framework
Hart established. 54 Ratner answered the question: "What exactly are the
Supreme Court's essential functions?" According to him, two elements defined
the Court's essential functions: "(1) to provide a tribunal for the ultimate
resolution of inconsistent or conflicting interpretations of federal law by state
and federal courts, and (2) to provide a tribunal for maintaining the supremacy
of federal law when it conflicts with state law or is challenged by state
authority."'55 Essential functions scholars since Ratner have continued to
emphasize the Court's primary role as guarantor of uniformity and supremacy
of federal law. Moreover, even absolutists who criticize Ratner's theory
concede that a grant of plenary power to Congress would undoubtedly inhibit,
if not destroy, these two functions.56
Notwithstanding the common sense appeal of the essential functions
theory, it suffers from the affliction common to all internal constraints theories:
Neither the term, "essential functions," nor the propositions for which it stands
can be found within the language of Article 1H."57 Essential functions
advocates, therefore, draw upon historical records-namely, the notes taken
during the Constitutional Convention-to vindicate their theory.58 There is
evidence to make at least a colorable argument that the Framers recognized the
53. Hart, supra note 27, at 1365. Later in his constructed dialogue, Hart concedes that applying an
essential functions calculus to jurisdiction stripping bills might be imprecise. Nevertheless, he concludes
with the rhetorical question: "[W]hatever the difficulties of the test, they are less, are they not. than the
difficulties of reading the Constitution as authorizing its own destruction?" Id.
54. See Ratner, Congressional Power, supra note 27.
55. Id. at 161. Twenty-two years later, Professor Ratner elaborated on the destructive effect that
plenary congressional power would precipitate:
Such legislation would distort the nature of the federal union by permitting each state to
decide for itself the scope of its authority under the Constitution. It would reduce the supreme
law of the land to a hodgepodge of sometimes inconsistent decisions by fifty state supreme
courts and/or twelve federal courts of appeals. It would thereby fragment and vitiate
constitutional protections.
Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints, supra note 27, at 935.
56. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 27, at 1038-39 (noting that jurisdiction stripping would undermine
constitutional structure and spirit, but that literal language of Constitution sanctions such practices).
57. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
58. See, e.g., Ratner, Congressional Power, supra note 27, at 161-65; Sager, supra note 27, at 45-55.
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Court's unique and essential role in ensuring uniformity and supremacy of
federal law. 9 Yet the historical record offers equivocal support at best.
Ultimately, when one considers the literal language of Article III, the
internal constraints interpretation is, as some commentators have put it,
"constitutional wishful thinking"'  and "question-begging.",6' If the Framers
had wished to qualify the Exceptions Clause by some principle akin to the
essential functions thesis, "why did they not simply say so? ' '62 That is, why
would the Framers adopt the unqualified language of the Exceptions Clause,
"the textual nub of the controversy," 63 if they intended to limit congressional
power over the Court's appellate jurisdiction?
The seemingly unbridled power unanimously affirmed in Er parte
McCardle64 has not gone unnoticed by essential functions critics. 6  Indeed,
the opinion erects a large doctrinal obstacle to any internal constraint
argument. However, pointing to the divisive political context in which the
McCardle decision was written, internal constraint theorists argue that the
decision should not be afforded great precedential value. Professor Lawrence
Gene Sager, for example, has suggested that "the Court acted in a highly
unusual historical context," and therefore its "dicta ... cannot be given much
weight."66 Although McCardle should be considered in its historical context,
it nevertheless remains in the United States Reports. Insofar as McCardle is the
only case in which the Court has addressed Congress's authority under the
Exceptions Clause, it is difficult to imagine that a federal court would reject
the decision out of hand.
In the end, the Exceptions Clause's sweeping language, the equivocal
historical record, and the Court's affirmation of plenary congressional power
in McCardle undermine internal constraint theories. While essential function
59. Two historical events during the Convention have provided the most salient bases for supponing
the essential functions thesis. First, South Carolina's John Rutledge. perhaps the Con~ention's strongest
Antifederalist, argued against the constitutional creation of lower federal courts but conceded that "the State
Tribunals might and ought to be left tn all cases to decide in the first instance the right of appeal to the
supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure the natxonal rights & uniformyir of Judgnts Isic) -
I MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787. at 124 (1911) (emphasis added)
Second, the Exceptions Clause was adopted only after the Convention had rejected a provtsion that
purportedly would have given Congress even greater power over the Court's appellate junsdiction "In all
the other cases before mentioned the Judicial power shall be exercised in such manner as the Legislaturt
shall direct." 2 id. at 431. As Professor Sager asserts, the defeat of this provision. coupled with the
subsequent adoption of the Exceptions Clause. undermines the notion that "the framers were consciously
adopting a provision that could completely unravel one of the most basic wpects of the constitutional
scheme to which they had committed themselves." Sager, supra note 27. at 51
60. Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 51. at 911
61. Gunther. supra note 27. at 908.
62. Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 51. at 911. see also Gunther. supra note 27. at 906
63. Gunther, supra note 27, at 906.
64. See supra Section II.A.
65. See. e.g., Bator, supra note 27, at 1040 (arguing that AlcCardle vindicates plenary view of
Exceptions Clause); Gunther. supra note 27, at 904-05 (same). Redish. Congressional Power. supra note
51, at 904 (same).
66. Sager, supra note 27. at 78 n.187.
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concerns for supremacy and uniformity of law offer salutary arguments for
why Congress should not strip the Court of jurisdiction, it does not explain
why Congress may not do so.
B. The Absolutists
Those who believe that the Exceptions Clause grants plenary authority to
Congress to restrict the Court's jurisdiction predicate their argument primarily
on the literal meaning of Article III. One commentator, whose view serves as
a pithy summary of the absolutist position, has remarked that Congress's
power under Article III
does not know any interior restrictions. The emphasis is appropriately
on the adjective "such." That is to say, such exceptions as Congress
shall make.
Like the commerce power, [Congress's control over jurisdiction]
may be put to promiscuous and undesirable uses, but the power is
there to make those damaging uses.67
The power absolutists envision is an awesome one. Of course, one could
construct a parade of horribles such that every class of case was relegated to
state court adjudication. Yet what makes this power as conceived by absolutists
so frightening is the fact that Congress has attempted to withdraw the Court's
jurisdiction over a number of highly divisive and constitutionally sensitive
issues ranging from abortion to school prayer to habeas corpus appeals. 8
Proponents of plenary congressional power assert that the Framers adopted
the Exceptions Clause in order to provide Congress with a check against
Supreme Court excesses.69 They argue that the Framers, recognizing that the
Court would be able to review the constitutionality of congressional
legislation,70 believed that the legislature would need an instrument to act as
both a shield and a sword. When compared with other congressional checks
on the judiciary, however, the Exceptions Clause resembles a meat cleaver
more than a scalpel. 7'
67. Constitutional Restraints upon the Judiciary: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 99 (1981) [hereinafter Constitutional Restraints]
(statement of William Van Alstyne).
68. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 27.
70. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing
that limitations on powers narrowly delegated to Congress "can be preserved in practice no other way than
through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest
tenor of the Constitution void").
71. Some examples of lesser checks are confirmation of presidential nominees, impeachment, and
reducing or augmenting the size of the Court.
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The absolutist position, despite its staggering implications, nevertheless
remains an extremely sound textual argument. While critics of this school of
thought strain to devise novel interpretations of Article III, the absolutists have
enjoyed the luxury of retreating to the explicit language of the Exceptions
Clause-language which on its face is unequivocal.
C. Conmnon Ground: Limiting the Exceptions Clause by Applying Erternal
Constitutional Constraints
Despite the hermetic separation between absolutists and their critics over
internal constraints on congressional power to restrict Court jurisdiction, most
commentators agree that Congress must still abide by the other generally
applicable constraints on congressional lawmaking. The plenary authority with
which absolutists would invest Congress is not unfettered. Rather, even
absolutists concede that general constitutional provisions external to Article III,
such as the Bill of Rights,72 equal protection, 73 and prohibitions contained
in section 9 of Article 114 remain applicable to congressional exercise of the
exceptions power.75 Congress's power under the Exceptions Clause, as
absolutists conceive it, "cannot be exercised in a manner which violates some
other Constitutional rule. In that sense-and in that sense only-it can be said
that Congress' power is not plenary."76
Because I will attempt to portray my theory as an external constitutional
constraint, this point deserves elaboration. The arena in which Congress
traditionally has enjoyed robust power is when it legislates pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. Nonetheless, irrespective of how broadly one defines
congressional authority under the Exceptions Clause, Congress must still abide
by external constitutional constraints such as the Equal Protection Clause.
Despite its extensive authority over interstate commerce, none would concede
that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to restrict travel on interstate
highways only to whites or Episcopalians. For example, one prominent
advocate of plenary congressional power under the Exceptions Clause agrees
that "broad as the power is in Congress to make exceptions to the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is not exempt from other constitutional
provisions, lying outside the 'exceptions' clause, that indeed describe
limitations that cut across most of the enumerated powers of Congress."' "
72. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
73. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V; see also Bollng v Sharpe. 347 U S 497 11954) (incorporating equal
protection guarantees into Fifth Amendment).
74. See U.S. CONST. art. I. § 9.
75. See, e.g., Constitutional Restraints, supra note 67. at 45 (statement of Paul M Bator), ld at
129-32 (statement of William Van Alstyne); Bator. supra note 27. at 1034. Gunther. supra note 27. at 916.
Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 51, at 915-23, Van Alstyne. supra note 29. at 263
76. Constitutional Restraints. supra note 67, at 44-45 (statement of Paul M Bator)
77. Id. at 132 (statement of William Van Alstyne)
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This notion-that the Exceptions Clause power is "policed from the
outside" 78-provides a salutary limitation on congressional authority to strip
the Court of its appellate jurisdiction.
A hypothetical example illustrates the distinction between "internal" and
"external" constraints. Perhaps the clearest illustration of an unconstitutional
use of the exceptions power would be a law denying the Supreme Court
jurisdiction to hear cases brought by African Americans. Notwithstanding the
invocation of the Exceptions Clause, Congress's explicit racial classification
would demand application of strict scrutiny analysis 79 and ultimately would
be found to violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment."0
Whatever the scope of Congress's power under the Exceptions Clause, none
would admit that it sanctions invidious discrimination.
It is important to distinguish between excepting federal court jurisdiction
over particular racial or religious groups and excepting jurisdiction over
particular classes of litigation. While the Constitution requires that Congress
legislate neutrally with respect to race or religion, "there is no independent
constitutional rule which says, absolutely or presumptively, that various
categories of constitutional litigation must be treated alike."'', For example,
assume that in 1981 Congress had passed H.R. 867, which would have
removed the Court's jurisdiction to hear any case that construed or interpreted
a state statute pertaining to abortion. 2 Although such a law would violate the
constitutional requirement of political accountability, as I argue later, the law
does not offend any other external constitutional provision or doctrine.83 Note
that, on its face, the law does not deny access to the Supreme Court based on
a protected classification. To be sure, the law might have a disproportionate
effect of keeping women out of the Court. However, the law equally would
deny a state that passed a restrictive abortion law, which was ruled
unconstitutional by a lower state or federal court, from appealing this ruling.
Commentators have failed to address whether the principle of external
constraints extends beyond explicit constitutional provisions to encompass
constitutional principles, which similarly regulate congressional lawmaking.
That is, concepts such as federalism,84 separation of powers, and, as I argue
78. Id. at 99.
79. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967).
80. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that principles of equal protection are
incorporated in Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause).
81. Constitutional Restraints, supra note 67, at 34 (statement of Paul M. Bator).
82. See H.R. 867, 97th Cong. § I (1981).
83. See infra Section IV.C.
84. Admittedly, the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers "not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution" to the separate states embodies classical principles of federalism. Particularly in the arena
of abstention doctrine, however, the Court's invocation of powerful notions such as "Our Federalism" rests
upon foundations broader than just the Tenth Amendment:
[O]ne familiar with the profound debates that ushered our Federal Constitution into existence
is bound to respect those who remain loyal to the ideals and dreams of "Our Federalism." ...
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later, political accountability 5 are not explicitly guaranteed or enshrined in
the Constitution. Nevertheless, they have traditionally served as potent checks
on Congress's lawmaking authority. Logically, there appears to be no reason
to limit Congress's power under the Exceptions Clause through application of
equal protection principles, yet deny the same limits based on separation of
powers or political accountability merely because the latter lack corresponding,
explicit constitutional provisions.
IV. UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AS AN EXTERNAL
CONSTRAINT
The doctrine of political accountability resolves the Exceptions Clause's
tension between Article III's plain language and constitutional design. More
accurately, political accountability prescribes a particular constitutional process
and design. It is within this paradigm of legislative responsibility that Congress
must always act-including invocations of its Exceptions Clause power.
This Note focuses on the inherent illegitimacy of legislation when
Congress fails to address the underlying policy questions. By deferring
resolution of the tough policy choices to the states, Congress is able to
implement national objectives without incurring the corresponding political
costs, thus "bypass[ing] constitutional requirements for proper federal
lawmaking."8 6 The absence of political accountability "enable[s] Congress to
advance federal policy through state institutions when a lack of majority
support for substantive national legislation might otherwise prevent federal
regulation."87 Often, Congress may wish to implement ambitious programs,
yet lacks a majority willing to subject itself to direct voter scrutiny. At a
minimum, political accountability requires Congress to "pass laws or make
binding policy in such a way that an electorate can hold Congress responsible
for that policy. '8 8 Departing from standards of political accountability
becomes an attractive option when "Congress cannot agree on the virtue of a
national regulatory plan. 89 Yet we must question whether the ultimate
product is valid. Such a practice is not only an unprincipled method of
legislating, but is also arguably unconstitutional.
It should never be forgotten that this slogan, " Our Federalism." born in the earl, struggling da) ,
of our Union of States, occupies a highly important place in our Nation's history and its future
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971). Thus, judicial conceptions of constitutional structure. design.
and Founding intent, in addition to the Tenth Amendment. inform our understanding of federalism
85. See infra Part IV.
86. The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REv 62. 190-91 (1982) (hereinafter 1981 TermI
87. Id. at 191.
88. Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Admintstrative
Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REv 62. 63 n 7 (1990) see also LaPierre. supru
note 22, at 640 (defining political accountability as "the "answcrubiltty' of represcntatt'es to the
represented").
89. 1981 Term, supra note 86. at 191.
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As a child of the administrative state, the doctrine of political
accountability has received its greatest attention in the context of congressional
delegation.9" The doctrine, however, has enjoyed considerable success in
assessing judicial recognition of implied rights of action in federal
legislation.9' Neither previous scholarship nor logic offers reasons why the
same principles that animate modem critiques of deceptive congressional
practices should not apply where Congress has discovered innovative measures
to bypass public scrutiny in contexts that implicate core constitutional values.
Indeed, as I argue later,92 the imperative to question such practices is even
greater in the arena of fundamental rights than in the realm of economic,
administrative actions.93
A. The Tenets and Rationales of the Political Accountability Doctrine
Fundamental to our democratic heritage is a watchful, vigilant public. Yet
when the legislature is able to implement important social policies while
evading the political pressures of public scrutiny, the legislative product is
illegitimate. Without political accountability, "[t]he public generally is denied
the benefits that are derived from the making of important societal choices
through the open debate of the democratic process." 94 Political accountability
demands that when Congress acts, it must decide the salient issues-not defer
to some other organ of government.
Of course, the reason Congress would wish to elude political accountability
is clear: It is often difficult to muster a majority vote on divisive social issues.
As congressional ability to insulate divisive policy decisions from public
scrutiny increases, the more likely it is that Congress will sustain majority
votes. In other words, the ability of Congress to implement divisive policy may
at times be inversely proportional to the level of public scrutiny.
Several interrelated theories strongly suggest that the doctrine of political
accountability is a prerequisite to constitutional legislation. First, political
accountability is a function of checks and balances. 95 Checks and balances,
in turn, are intended to ensure that the tumultuous legislative process will
90. See, e.g., James . Blumstein, Constitutional Perspectives on Governmental Decisions Affecting
Human Life and Health, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1976, at 231; LaPierre, supra note 22;
Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy. Federalism for a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REv. I (1988).
91. See infra text accompanying notes 107-15.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 158-62.
93. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (raising question,
without deciding, "whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry").
94. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 743 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
95. See LaPierre, supra note 22, at 642.
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distill the wisest and most rights-protective government policy.6 Where
Congress is permitted to insulate itself from the political ramifications of the
policy it sets in motion, the legitimacy of that law is suspect.
The constitutional design never contemplated that the legislative process
would elevate efficiency above individual liberty and policy wisdom. If
anything, the Framers explicitly engineered a system in which legislating
would be a laborious and intentionally inefficient process-thereby maximizing
societal input and minimizing the possibility that factions (majority or
minority) could subvert liberty interests. 97  The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that the Framers intended the legislative process to be
deliberative-even at the cost of inefficiency:
[I]t is crystal clear from the records of the Convention,
contemporaneous writings and debates, that the Framers ranked other
values higher than efficiency. The records of the Convention and
debates in the states preceding ratification underscore the common
desire to define and limit the exercise of the newly created federal
powers affecting the states and the people. There is unmistakable
expression of a determination that legislation by the national Congress
be a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative process. 9'
Thus, commentators have found in the arena of administrative delegation that,
although it might be more efficient to defer to the wisdom of agency experts,
ultimate wisdom compels deference to the original constitutional design."
Even apart from questions of administrative delegation, Congress
frequently attempts to insulate its actions merely because it lacks the political
courage to accept the consequences of its political choices.iO Divisive social
issues invariably complicate the passage of comprehensive legislation. Even if
a majority of the members of Congress concur that a pending bill will advance
national interests, electoral pressures ultimately may trump perceived wisdom.
This congressional phenomenon has not gone unnoticed by legal
commentators. Concerning the absence of political accountability in the
administrative state, Judge J. Skelly Wright observed that -[w]hen Congress
is too divided or uncertain to articulate policy, it is no doubt easier to pass an
organic statute with vague language about the 'public interest' which tells the
96. See Krent, supra note 88, at 65 n.l1.
97. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51. supra note 70. at 325 (James Madison) ("In the extended republic
of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects w.hich it embraces, a
coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other prnciples than those of
justice and the general good .... "); see also THE FEDERALIST No 10, supra note 70. at 77 (James
Madison) ("Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union. none descrves to be
more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction ")
98. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919. 958-59 (1983).
99. See, e.g., Krent, supra note 88. at 65 n. 11.
100. See supra note 4.
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agency, in effect, to get the job done."'0 ' Basic conceptions of political
instinct suggest that if Congress may adopt one of two approaches to an issue
of national concern-either directly address the problem through explicit
legislation or insulate itself from political scrutiny-Congress has incentives
to take the latter route. Yet this defeats the purpose of broad based
representative assemblies, which is "to require some degree of public
consensus before governmental action occurs. '""
B. The Constitutional Underpinnings of the Political Accountability Doctrine
Political accountability ensures that the policies that emanate from
Congress are indeed predicated on popular support. In the absence of
accountability, not only is the legislative product corrupt, but it is also
unconstitutional:
[T]he theory of political accountability has a solid constitutional
foundation.... Moreover, the theory of political accountability is also
supported by a fundamental, albeit implicit, postulate of the
Constitution: democratic self-governance. Courts should invoke the
constitutionally uncertain and exceptional power of judicial review,
and interfere with democratic self-governance, only if national
political choices are not the product of a national majority.10 3
The two instances in which Congress has exercised its Exceptions Clause
power have denied courts the opportunity to apply a political accountability
test. The Supreme Court, however, has articulated several formulas for
measuring the extent to which Congress abides by politically accountable
standards.
Courts and commentators have built a solid foundation upon which to
extend a theory of political accountability to Article III. The Supreme Court
applied political accountability to invalidate part of a congressional legislative
scheme in New York v. United States.' 4 Moreover, relying extensively on
Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon v. University of Chicago,°5 which
explicitly noted the constitutional necessity of political accountability, the
Court has scaled back significantly the scope of judicial recognition of implied
rights of action. 0 6 Finally, a growing number of scholars has proposed
101. Wright, supra note 2, at 584-85.
102. Id. at 585.
103. LaPierre, supra note 22, at 642-43.
104. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
105. 441 U.S. 677. 730 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
106. Interestingly, less than two months after Cannon, the Court initiated its steady retreat from
broadly inferring private rights of action in federal laws in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
(1979). Justice Rehnquist silently rejected the Cannon reasoning by noting that the Court's task "is limited
solely to determining whether Congress intended to create the private right of action asserted." Id. at 568.
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vigorous application of political accountability to congressional delegations of
legislative authority. To be sure, none of these courts or commentators has
directly applied the doctrine of political accountability to Article III. Yet the
logic and broader implications compel one conclusion: When Congress
exercises its Exceptions Clause power, it must confront the burdens and
political costs by deciding the fundamental, underlying policy choices.
In Cannon,'0 7 the Supreme Court found an implied private right of action
under Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. '0 The plaintiff sought an
injunction under the statute, which provided that "[no person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."'O' The Court, despite the
statute's silence, found that the legislation did provide a private right of action.
What is of interest, however, is the lengthy dissent that Justice Powell filed.
Powell went beyond attacking the Court's analysis as unwise. Indeed, he
viewed the doctrine of implied rights of action as unconstitutional. Drawing
upon the language of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,"'' Powell noted that "[i]f only
a question of statutory construction were involved,""' it might be
permissible to discern legislative intent in the face of silence. However, "'the
unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear' and
compels us to abandon the implication doctrine."
'
"1 2
The core of Justice Powell's constitutional attack focused on separation of
powers." 3 Yet embedded within his analysis was a profound concern for the
absence of political responsibility. Powell noted that as the judiciary became
more active in assigning rights of action where Congress never explicitly voted
to establish them, the courts would "invite[] Congress to avoid resolution of
the often controversial question whether a new regulatory statute should be
enforced through private litigation.""' 4 Powell elaborated on the constitutional
and policy implications that would stem from congressional avoidance:
Rather than confronting the hard political choices involved, Congress
is encouraged to shirk its constitutional obligation and leave the issue
to the courts to decide. When this happens, the legislative process
with its public scrutiny and participation has been bypassed, with
attendant prejudice to everyone concenied "
107. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
108. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994).
109. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 681-82.
110. 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938).
Ill. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting).
112. Id. (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78).
113. See id. at 731, 740-42.
114. Id. at 743.
115. Id. (emphasis added).
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In 1980, Justice Rehnquist appealed to political accountability in his
concurring opinion to Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute.' 16 Under § 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970, the Secretary of Labor was empowered to set a standard for
exposure to toxic substances "which most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will
suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity.'"" 7 Justice
Rehnquist found that the language of § 6(b)(5) gave the Secretary of Labor
"absolutely no indication where on the continuum of relative safety he should
draw his line."" 8
Intimating that political accountability is constitutionally mandated,
Rehnquist asserted that the courts must "reshoulder the burden of ensuring that
Congress itself make the critical policy decisions."'" 9 Echoing the reasoning
and justifications that Powell articulated in Cannon, Rehnquist attacked this
law as an "obvious example of Congress simply avoiding a choice which was
both fundamental for purposes of the statute and yet politically so divisive that
the necessary decision or compromise was difficult, if not impossible, to
hammer out in the legislative forge."'' 20 Here, Congress desired to implement
an extensive regulation. Yet it lacked the collective political capital to legislate
the intended result directly. Nevertheless, it succeeded by going through the
back door-a door hidden from public view and criticism. Had Congress been
required to promulgate directly the substantive provisions of the law, the bill's
chances of success likely would have been poor.
Political accountability sets a minimum standard for legislative
responsibility. According to Justice Rehnquist, the doctrine of political
accountability mandates that it is
the hard choices, and not the filling in of the blanks, which must be
made by the elected representatives of the people. When fundamental
policy decisions underlying important legislation about to be enacted
are to be made, the buck stops with Congress and the President
insofar as he exercises his constitutional role in the legislative
process. '21
Again, political accountability requires Congress to address the salient policy
choices that form the core of any legislation. A bill that garners a majority
vote, but whose substantive provisions are to be defined later by an entity
different from Congress, falls beneath the minimum requirements. Political
116. 448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
117. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1994).
118. Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 675 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
120. Id.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
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accountability ensures that Congress does not pass facially innocuous
legislation that is pregnant with divisive policy choices awaiting
implementation from another organ of government.
In 1992, political accountability received its most developed consideration
by the Supreme Court. In New York v. United States,"'2 the Court invalidated
a congressional attempt to coerce states to "take title" to toxic waste under the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. '23 Under
this Act, any state that was unable to dispose of its own toxic waste by 1996
would "take title to the waste" and would "be obligated to take possession of
the waste."' 2 4 In essence, Congress attempted to force states to regulate
according to federal standards, but required the states to implement and finance
the program without federal assistance. Thus Congress sought to achieve
federal objectives without the concomitant pressure of accounting to a
disgruntled electorate. While the Court largely defined the issue as one of
federalism,'2 Justice O'Connor employed a political accountability analysis
in assessing the Act's constitutionality.
The Court succinctly stated that "where the Federal Government compels
States to regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is
diminished."' 126 If Congress were permitted to fashion legislative schemes in
which state officials were forced to implement federal standards, the electorate
might mistakenly direct its ire at the relatively blameless state representatives,
"while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain
insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision."' According to
the New York Court, Congress would not have offended political accountability
had it passed legislation that required federal officials to maintain and pay for
the storage of radioactive waste in New York. That is, where Congress
legislates directly on a particular issue, "the Federal Government ... makes
the decision in full view of the public, and it will be federal officials that
suffer the consequences if the decision turns out to be detrimental or
unpopular."'' 2 8 Again, the Court underscored the importance of Congress
publicly addressing the underlying policy choices. As in Cannon and Industrial
Union, the New York Court elevated congressional responsibility to a level of
constitutional primacy.
The decision in New York presents a strong political accountability critique
of congressional lawmaking. To be sure, the facts in New York were
particularly egregious. Not only did Congress insulate itself from
122. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1994).
124. Id. § 2021e(d)(2)(C)(i).
125. See New York, 505 U.S. at 149 ("This case implicates one of our Nation's ncsest problems of
public policy and perhaps our oldest question of constitutional law").
126. Id. at 168.
127. Id. at 169.
128. Id. at 168.
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responsibility, but it also coerced a separate government entity to take the
blame. In the context of the Exceptions Clause, the latter concern is absent.
Nevertheless, the New York decision is concerned not just with cases in which
Congress forces states to absorb the political fallout from federal decisions, but
also with the very legitimacy of congressional action when it is not notorious
and subject to public view.
In a prescient article, 29 the Harvard Law Review's commentary on the
Supreme Court's 1981 Term questioned the legitimacy of a congressional
statute similar to the one invalidated eleven years later in New York v. United
States."30 Because the earlier statute did "not compel the states to regulate in
the federal interest but merely mandate[d] consideration of federal
standards,"'1' it was arguably less troublesome than the one considered in
New York. By finding the substantially less offensive practice to violate
political accountability constraints, the article validates a significantly broader
application of political accountability to congressional practice.
C. The Clear Statement Rule: Drawing Lessons About Political Accountability
from the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity
Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court's "clear statement" 'rule in Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity cases underscores that institution's concerns for, among
other things, politically accountable legislation. During the past decade, the
Court consistently has held that Congress may abrogate a state's constitutional
right to sovereign immunity 32 "only by making its intention unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute."' 33 This strict insistence on unambiguous
legislation is predicated on two concerns: to provide clear notice to those who
may be affected by Congress's actions and to ensure that Congress seriously
deliberates whether to trump a constitutional right.
In Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public Transportation,t
the Supreme Court concluded that Congress failed to state clearly its intention
to abrogate sovereign immunity under section 33 of the Jones Act. 3
Although the Jones Act provided that "[a]ny seaman who shall suffer personal
129. See 1981 Term, supra note 86.
130. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
131. 1981 Term, supra note 86, at 191.
132. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), the Supreme Court affirmed Congress's power to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Bitzer Court reasoned that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment empowered Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity in order to enforce the substantive
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 452.
133. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985); see also Hoffman v. Connecticut
Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989); Welch v.
Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
134. 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
135. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1994).
[Vol. 106: 197
Jurisdiction Stripping
injury in the course of his employment may ... maintain an action for
damages at law,"' 36 the Court found that this "general authorization for suit
in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.'" 31 Similarly, in Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon, 31 the Court found that Congress did not act with
unmistakable clarity when it authorized lawsuits against "any recipient of
Federal assistance"' 39 who discriminates against handicapped persons."
Although the State of California undeniably was a recipient of federal funds,
the Court found that this broad provision did not unequivocally demonstrate
that Congress intended to abrogate California's constitutional right
immunity. 4'
What is striking about Welch and Atascadero is that two broadly worded
statutes, which on their face made no distinction between private and public
employers, were held to be insufficiently clear about whether they
encompassed state employers. Of course, no one would intimate that the
statutes' broad scope would fail to reach private employers. The clear
statement rule thus creates a two-tiered approach by which to measure whether
a statute authorizes lawsuits against private and state employers.
What justifies this bifurcated calculus? The Court recognizes that normal
precepts of accountability and deliberation are insufficient when Congress
threatens to abrogate constitutional rights. That is, the Court appreciates that
Congress's abrogation authority invests it with extraordinary power to
undermine perhaps the most important constitutional right that states possess.
Congressional legislation such as that at issue in Welch and Atascadero poses
no constitutional threat to private employers. Yet to extend the reach of those
laws to states would imperil important constitutional interests. The elementary
notion that constitutional rights are more precious and fragile than
nonconstitutional rights accounts for the heightened accountability requirements
that the Supreme Court has imposed on Congress's abrogation power.
The clear statement rule attempts to reconcile Congress's recognized
abrogation authority with the reality that its exercise may precipitate substantial
damage to constitutional rights. A requirement of "unmistakable clear"
purpose 42 achieves this tenuous balance in two ways: first, by forcing
Congress to consider and seriously deliberate the consequences of its actions;
second, by serving an explicit admonition to those whom Congress may affect
adversely that their constitutional protections may be insecure. As the Court
136. Id. § 688(a).
137. Welch, 483 U.S. at 476 (quoting Atascadero. 473 U.S. at 246).
138. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
139. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994) (emphasis added)
140. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 242.
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recently reaffirmed: "Only when Congress has clearly considered the problem
and expressly declared that any State ... will be deemed thereby to have
waived its immunity should courts disallow the invocation of this
defense."' 4 3 By forcing Congress to state distinctly that it intends to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the clear statement rule compels Congress to
address this controversial proposition in an open debate that fosters deliberative
legislation.
D. Applying Political Accountability to the Exceptions Clause
I now turn to articulate a better interpretation of the Exceptions
Clause-an interpretation that accounts for both the literal language of Article
III and the external constraints that the Constitution imposes on congressional
lawmaking. Like all issues examined under a political accountability rubric, the
Exceptions Clause power must be exercised in such a manner that Congress
addresses the underlying policy issues. If the Court imposes political
accountability requirements, Congress will be forced to contemplate seriously
any exercise of its awesome power under Article III. In turn, this deliberation
will elevate Congress's actions to a level of national consciousness-informing
the electorate and assuring sober use of congressional power.
Political accountability retains Congress's plenary power to restrict
Supreme Court jurisdiction over laws that Congress itself passes. Yet when
Congress insulates state laws from Court review, it is often attempting to
achieve "through the back door what it could not accomplish in direct,
democratic fashion."'" That is, it is too easy for Congress to empower states
to enact legislation that it wanted to pass, but lacked the votes to adopt
explicitly. Such a practice allows Congress to set national policy on
controversial issues, without facing the political consequences of directly
addressing them.
Analyses of the doctrine of political accountability are relatively novel.
Until the introduction of the modern administrative state, legislating was an
uncomplicated practice. Yet, as federal agencies multiplied, and as Congress
began to delegate increasing legislative responsibility, courts and commentators
alike questioned the legitimacy of this new practice. When Congress delegates
legislative authority to other entities, it balks at deciding the important policy
concerns underlying legislation, and similarly eschews the political
concomitants of unpopular policy formulation: reaching initial consensus,
enduring press coverage, and responding to constituent pressure.
143. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 477 (1987) (quoting Parden
v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 198-99 (1964) (White, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added).
144. Wright, supra note 2, at 586.
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1. Requiring Congress to Address Underlying Policy Choices
Central to political accountability is Congress's duty to decide the
important issues underlying legislation. 4  Several questions must be
answered to determine whether Congress invokes its Exceptions Clause power
constitutionally. First, does the revocation of jurisdiction reflect a national
policy? If so, does the withdrawal of jurisdiction sufficiently indicate that
Congress has explicitly adopted that policy? With this calculus, it becomes
clear that Congress retains plenary power to strip the Court of jurisdiction to
review congressional laws, but it often may not insulate state laws from Court
scrutiny.
Recent history counsels that when Congress attempts to exercise its
Exceptions Clause power, it is often trying to remove jurisdiction specific to
a particular issue."4 Take, for example, a bill that Senator Helms proposed
several years ago.'47 It would have abolished the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction over "any case arising out of any State statute, ordinance, rule,
regulation, or any part thereof.., which relates to voluntary prayers in public
schools and public buildings."'48 If Congress were to enact such a law today,
there are several conclusions that one might draw depending on the level of
cynicism with which one views Congress. At one end of the spectrum, the law
reflects hostility to the Court's conception of the establishment of religion, and
heralds a call to promulgate official prayers in public schools. At the other end,
the law reflects disagreement with the Court that school prayer is a
constitutional issue, and a belief that states are best able to resolve the issue.
Regardless of which conception one adopts, the proposal is, at a minimum,
predicated on opposition to a constitutionally protected right.' '9
Moreover, under both views, Congress must be deemed to know what
might result. That is, it is clearly foreseeable, if not expressly contemplated
and desired, that statehouses will take this opportunity to legislate in
contravention of the Constitution.'5 ° To take another example, a bill that
145. See supra Section IV.A.
146. See supra notes 4-5 (enumerating congressional bills proposing withdrawal of Court's jurisdiction
over abortion and school prayer).
147. See S. 481, 97th Cong. (1981).
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Some might argue that jurisdiction-stripping bills do not oppose particular constitutional rights.
rather, they reflect disagreement with the Supreme Court that the nght in question is actually protected by
the Constitution. However, since 1803 it has been stated that "lilt is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v Madison. 5 U S 0 Cranch) 137. 177 (18031.
accord Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[Tlhe federal judiciary is supreme in the expositton of
the law of the Constitution .... "). The Exceptions Clause does not dismantle this fundamental principle
of constitutional law. It merely permits Congress to legislate in direct contravention of established
constitutional rights without review from the federal judiciary
150. For an interesting discussion of whether state courts would remain bound by the precedent of the
Supreme Court, see Redish, Congressional Power. supra note 51. at 925-26
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would remove abortion cases from the Court's docket' 5' clearly is motivated,
in whole or in part, by a desire to ban abortion. Admittedly, other concerns
such as federalism may play peripheral roles. 52 But it is the legality and
regulation of abortion upon which the jurisdiction bill is predicated.
By enacting a vague bill with innocuous language, Congress is able to
employ the states as conduits of national policy. Cognizant that several states
will accept the "lewd wink"'' 53 to criminalize abortion, Congress effectively
implements national policy without having to vote on the difficult, underlying
issue: Should abortion be legal? Political accountability demands more.
Congress must address the underlying issue of abortion's legality in order to
comport with constitutional design. As discussed previously, Congress does not
shirk this difficult policy choice by accident. Rather, delegating ultimate
resolution to the states relieves Congress from having to vote directly on
whether to ban abortion-a vote that would presumably fall short of a
majority. This practice sanctions the imposition of national policy without
garnering a national consensus.
There is nothing unconstitutional, however, when Congress passes its own
substantive law and concomitantly insulates it from federal court review. If, for
example, Congress passed a bill that permitted abortions only when the life of
the mother were in jeopardy, it would have clearly articulated an abortion
policy. The direct nature of the statute ensures public scrutiny, careful
deliberation, and, most importantly, accountability for the policy's effects.
Then, if Congress took the extra step of removing this bill from the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction, that action would be a valid exercise of its
Exceptions Clause power. The difference between this case and that in which
Congress insulates state laws is the difference between accountability,
deliberation, and due process on the one hand, and insulation, arbitrariness, and
unconstitutionality on the other.
2. Fulfilling the Objectives of the Clear Statement Rule
The justifications for the clear statement rule in the Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence also hold when one applies the doctrine of political
accountability to the Exceptions Clause. First, by requiring Congress to address
the underlying policy choice, political accountability ensures greater
deliberation within Congress. Like the Welch Court, which would find
congressional intent to abrogate immunity "[o]nly when Congress has clearly
considered the problem,"'54 federal courts should apply the political
151. See, e.g., H.R. 867, 97th Cong. (1981).
152. See infra Subsection IV.C.3.
153. Professor Sager coined this phrase in Sager, supra note 27, at 41.
154. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 477 (1987) (quoting Parden
v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 198 (1964) (White, J., dissenting)).
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accountability doctrine to legislation in which Congress invokes its Exceptions
Clause power in order to foster deliberation and reasoned lawmaking. Second,
the political accountability doctrine shares the clear statement rule's attempt to
place the electorate on notice about congressional actions that may disparage
constitutional rights. 55
Both the clear statement rule and the political accountability doctrine in the
Exceptions Clause context are predicated on a recognition that legislating-as-
usual may not be adequate when Congress threatens to encroach on
constitutional rights. Thus nothing short of specific and unmistakably clear
expressions of congressional purpose will suffice to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity.156 Likewise, the doctrine of political
accountability mandates that Congress must define specifically the limits of
state authority to transgress settled constitutional law and exempt those acts
from Supreme Court review.
The clear statement rule compels Congress to deliberate seriously the
consequences of abrogating Eleventh Amendment rights. By doing so, it
protects against two evils of unaccountable legislation. First, it ensures that the
legislature considers the scope and effect of abrogating the Eleventh
Amendment. Second, a clear statement guards against the possibility that
Congress may have desired to abrogate sovereign immunity, but simply lacked
the political courage to state so explicitly.
These salutary purposes of the clear statement rule apply with equal force
to the doctrine of political accountability in the Exceptions Clause cases.
Constraining congressional power under the Exceptions Clause by requiring
explicit, accountable legislation promotes the same virtues that the Court has
lauded in its clear statement rule cases: deliberate consideration and clear
warning to those affected. 57 By defining the limits within which states may
pass legislation that infringes on fundamental constitutional rights, the doctrine
of political accountability safeguards against unwise and promiscuous uses of
Congress's awesome power. Neither the clear statement rule nor the doctrine
of political accountability denies Congress its constitutional authority to
abrogate sovereign immunity or to strip federal court jurisdiction. Rather, these
limiting rules reflect a certain skepticism that normal legislative processes are
inadequate and unaccountable when Congress stands on the cusp of eroding
delicate constitutional rights.
One objection to this analogy is that when Congress strips the Court of
jurisdiction, there is no deprivation of a constitutional right. After all, there is
no constitutional right to have the Supreme Court hear one's appeal. Moreover,
when Congress abrogates sovereign immunity, it affirmatively abolishes a
155. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 478 (affirming that Supreme Court "consistently has required an
unequivocal expression that Congress intended to overrde Eleventh Amendment immunity")
156. See, e.g., id. at 477-78- Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon. 473 U S. 234. 242 (1985)
157. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 477: Atascadero. 473 U.S. at 242
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constitutional protection. This distinction, however, is specious. While it is true
that there is no constitutional right to take one's case to the Supreme Court,
when Congress strips the Court of jurisdiction to hear all abortion cases, it is
likely that some individuals will lose the fundamental right to elect to have an
abortion.
Moreover, it is not entirely clear that Congress definitively strips each state
of a constitutional protection merely by passing a statute that purports to
abrogate sovereign immunity. In some states, no authorized litigants may have
occasion to sue the state. Therefore, those states have not appreciated any lost
constitutional right. While this formalism sounds almost absurd, it is no
different from those critics who suggest that Congress has not deprived
individuals of a constitutional right by stripping the Court of jurisdiction over
cases involving a woman's right to have an abortion, for example. In both
instances, Congress's act is not sufficient to deny completely a constitutional
right. Both situations depend on third party action to consummate the
undermining of a fundamental right: Congress's attempt at abrogation requires
a litigant to file a lawsuit, and Congress's Exceptions Clause power requires
a state to pass an unconstitutional law that escapes Court review. In both
instances, fragile constitutional rights hang in a precarious balance. The
Supreme Court already has responded to this by promulgating the clear
statement rule. The constitutional values that Congress implicates when it
exercises its Exceptions Clause power necessitate a check on normal legislating
behavior equally as potent as the clear statement rule. The doctrine of political
accountability achieves this constitutional imperative.
3. Comporting with the Language of Article III and Supreme Court
Precedent
Application of political accountability to the Exceptions Clause, unlike
other limiting theories, does not require courts to do violence to the language
of Article III. The theory does not dispute Congress's plenary power to restrict
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Rather, it applies a modern
principle that has been recognized to constrain congressional lawmaking
authority. Additionally, political accountability profits from another advantage
over other limitation theories. The Supreme Court has gradually come to
recognize political accountability as a constitutional requirement of the
legislative process. Not only has the Court applied political accountability to
economic and regulatory schemes, 5 ' but it also has applied more vigorous
158. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144. 149 (1992) ("[W]hile Congress has
substantial power under the Constitution to encourage the states to provide for the disposal of the
radioactive waste generated within their borders .... Congress ... [cannot] compel the states to do so.");




scrutiny to delegations that implicate fundamental liberty interests. 5 ' The
Supreme Court has intimated that when congressional delegation threatens core
constitutional values, it is essential that the lawmaking process strictly adhere
to politically accountable standards.
In Greene v. McElroy,'60 the Court refused to find an implicit
congressional delegation of authority to the Department of Defense to
administer a constitutionally questionable security clearance program. The
Court conceded that if the case had turned solely upon economic regulation,
Congress's action might have been sufficient. However, when Congress
attempts to delegate authority that impinges upon constitutional liberty
interests, its actions "must be made explicit[] not only to assure that
individuals are not deprived of cherished rights under procedures not actually
authorized ... but also because explicit action, especially in areas of doubtfd
constitutionality, requires careful and purposeful consideration by those
responsible for enacting and implementing our lawss.''. The Supreme Court
recognized the dangers of casual lawmaking where vague authorizations
threaten protected liberty interests. Moreover, the Court placed a high premium
on deliberation as a prerequisite to lawmaking-especially where the
legislation's subject may possibly transcend constitutional boundaries.
The Court's opinion in Greene underscores the heightened need for
applying political accountability to the Exceptions Clause. Certainly, privacy
is one of the most fundamental rights that the Constitution protects. When
Congress acts under the Exceptions Clause, it is incumbent upon the judiciary
to ensure that Congress has explicitly authorized the deprivation of these
cherished rights. In turn, requiring explicit lawmaking under the Exceptions
Clause will precipitate greater deliberation, maximize public scrutiny, and
ensure that if Congress ultimately decides to emasculate constitutional rights,
the decision, at least, will be based on a true national consensus. 62
To be sure, the Court has never applied the theory to the Exceptions
Clause. This, however, is not surprising. The only time the Court assessed the
propriety of Congress's Exceptions Clause power was in the McCardle'63
decision in 1868. Despite McCardle's unique historical context, it has remained
a formidable obstacle to internal constraint theorists. The result of McCardle,
159. See. e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474. 508 (1959) t("lln the absence of explicit
authorization from either the President or Congress the respondents were not empoered to depnve
petitioner of his job in a proceeding in which he was not afforded safeguards of confrontation and cro-
examination.").
160. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
161. Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
162. Insofar as liberty interests protected by the Constitution arce designed to be immune from popular
vote and whim, it seems almost comical to discuss requirng a majonty before Congress ma, subordinate
constitutional freedoms. Yet that is clearly what the Exceptions Clause contemplates Nonetheles,. the
Exceptions Clause should not be read to go any further. Courts must insist that Congres: assemble a true
consensus before it invokes its power under the Exceptions Clause
163. Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868).
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however, is entirely consistent with political accountability. The 1868 Congress
did not insulate any state law from the Supreme Court's review. Instead,
Congress merely denied the Court jurisdiction to hear a federal habeas corpus
petition brought under an earlier congressional authorization. Even if
McCardle is viewed in a vacuum, without regard to its exceptional historical
context, the result erects no precedential barrier to the political accountability
theory.
4. Taking Federalism into Account
Perhaps Congress's motivation in exempting only state laws from the
Court's appellate jurisdiction is more benign than portrayed above. It is
conceivable that the animus stems from a concern for federalism-to return to
the states the power that they once possessed over fundamental liberty interests
such as abortion and school prayer. Does political accountability prevent
Congress from ever empowering the states to legislate free from federal
judicial scrutiny? Despite diminished accountability and the prospect of greater
disrespect for constitutional freedoms, the answer is no.' 64
However, Congress must do more than pass the perfunctory laws that it
has proposed in the last few years. 165 A hypothetical example illustrates the
contours of the political accountability theory when applied to this federalism
context. Let us assume that Congress wishes to permit the states to regulate
abortion without the possibility of Court invalidation. Remaining cognizant of
the political accountability doctrine's requirement that Congress address the
underlying policy questions, the task is to devise a legislative scheme in which
Congress confronts these issues, yet defers ultimate resolution to the states.
Congress will sufficiently meet political accountability standards if
Congress itself prescribes the precise limits of state regulation. That is,
Congress must affirmatively establish a threshold level of regulation beyond
which the states may not transgress. Returning to the hypothetical abortion bill,
Congress may wish to permit the states unfettered control over abortion, except
for emergency health contingencies such as the life of the mother. Even if
Congress did not wish to attach any qualifications to the power states would
have over abortion, political accountability would still require Congress to state
explicitly that it is authorizing the states to regulate abortion without any limits
whatsoever. Once Congress defined the parameters of permissible state action,
it could then proceed to exempt its law and all state laws passed in accordance
with this authorization from the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
164. Of course, the most constitutionally sound manner by which to commission the states to legislate
without fear of federal court review is to amend the Constitution. See U.S. CONsT. art. V.
165. See supra note 4; see also supra text accompanying note 148 (quoting relevant portion of bill
stripping Court of jurisdiction over school prayer).
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Following this approach reconciles the constitutional imperative of
accountable lawmaking with the strong interest in federalism. The procedure
outlined above does not impair congressional attempts to facilitate state
regulation of constitutional liberties. While under this theory Congress may
prescribe limits on the discretion that states possess, it need not attach any
qualifications. What Congress must do, however, in order to satisfy
accountability standards is to address the underlying policy-to wit, the extent
to which legislatures may regulate constitutional liberty interests.
Of course, the doctrine of political accountability is not without its limits.
Even the theory's strongest advocates concede that delegation, to some extent,
is both necessary and constitutional."6 Yet Congress may delegate without
violating accountability. In the administrative context, scholars and jurists alike
have found that so long as Congress confronts and resolves the underlying
issues of a particular regulatory regime, it may delegate within that policy
determination. 67 I do not pretend that political accountability forecloses any
delegation. However, if scholars and, to an increasing extent, courts are willing
to assert political accountability in purely economic and regulatory areas, the
application to fundamental constitutional rights is an easy one.
5. Remaining Faithful to Constitutional Design and Structure
In Federalist 51, James Madison lauded the new republic's federal design
for its singular capacity to vindicate individual and minority rights.' In
contrast to the parochial interests of smaller state bodies, Madison found that
Congress, "by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of
citizens ... render[s] an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very
improbable, if not impracticable." '69 The wisdom of Madison's insights
remains as powerful today.
Congressional proposals that withdraw jurisdiction over state laws in order
to avoid public accountability appreciate the phenomena Madison identified in
Federalist 51. When it legislates accountably, Congress's "multiplicity of
interests '  substantially minimizes the possibility that "a coalition of a
majority of the whole society could ... take place on any other principles than
those of justice and the general good."'' Although Congress has strayed
from Madison's noble vision at times, it has proven itself immune from many
of the factions that have seized statehouses during the past two centuries.
166. See Krent, supra note 88, at 63 n.8; LaPierre, supra note 22. at 657. Mcmil. supra note 90. at
25.
167. See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v Amencan Petroleum Inst. 448 U S 607. 687
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring): LaPierre, supra note 22. at 653
168. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 70, at 323-25 (Jame Madison)
169. Id. at 324.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 325.
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Indeed, the quotation that appears at the beginning of this Note underscores
Oliver Wendell Holmes's faith in Congress and concomitant distrust of state
legislatures' propensity to abide by the Constitution. 72 Commenting on his
unique capacity to evaluate the more parochial, and often unconstitutional,
character of local laws that regulate commerce, Holmes noted that: "For one
in my place sees how often a local policy prevails with those who are not
trained to national views and how often action is taken that embodies what the
Commerce Clause was meant to end."'173
Madison's observations, and the republican government he envisioned, are
most consistent with the political accountability theory. By limiting the scope
of Congress's Exceptions Clause power to the insulation of its own laws, the
political accountability theory draws on the natural political forces that
Madison identified. First, sheer numbers and diversity of opinion will minimize
the frequency with which Congress attempts to strip the Court of jurisdiction.
Second, when Congress is able to muster the votes and elects to exercise its
Exceptions Clause power, these same forces-numerosity and diversity of
opinion-will dilute the strong factional forces that may exist within state
legislatures. Accordingly, there is reason to suspect that the laws that would
emanate from Congress would be substantially more moderate than laws that
originated in statehouses.
V. CONCLUSION
The political accountability theory prevents Congress from manipulating
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over fundamental constitutional rights through
legislative sleight-of-hand. In contrast to many internal constraint arguments,
the accountability theory enjoys doctrinal support. Although the Supreme Court
has not applied the doctrine of political accountability to the Exceptions
Clause, it has invoked the doctrine to constrain other manifestations of
congressional power. Because the Court has recognized that the doctrine
generally constrains Congress, there is a legitimate basis for applying the
doctrine as an external constraint on Congress's Exceptions Clause power.
Unlike many other proposals to limit this power, the accountability theory
reconciles the literal language of Article III with constitutional design.
Moreover, the political accountability doctrine allows courts to summon forth
the political forces that the Framers designed to constrain congressional power.
By insisting that Congress affirmatively decide the policy questions that it
seeks to remove from the Court's jurisdiction, the theory ensures
accountability, deliberation, and moderation.
172. See supra note I and accompanying text.
173. HOLMES, supra note 1, at 296 (emphasis added).
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